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telecom auction, and observe that Börgers’ and Dustmann’s (2002) results are
consistent with the outcome having been eﬃcient.
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Abstract
Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter (2002) have developed an intriguing expla-
nation for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 German 3G telecom
auction. These comments on their paper discuss why I do not ﬁnd their ex-
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several other 3G auctions.
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I offer an explanation for some of the bidding in the year 2000 British 3G 
telecom auction, and observe that Börgers’ and Dustmann’s (2002) results are  
consistent with the outcome having been efficient. 
 
I. Introduction 
Börgers and Dustmann (2002a), henceforth B -D, is a very valuable and 
insightful paper that is full of useful detail about the actual bidding in the UK 3G 
auction and will become a key reference for anyone studying it. 
As discussed in Klemperer (2002 a,c) and Binmore and Klemperer (2002), the 
UK auction was one of the most successful of the western European 3G 
auctions. Indeed in terms of revenue raised per capita it was  the most 
successful of all the auctions, and it is therefore appropriate to examine, as B-D 
do, whether the auction's outcome was also as efficient as is often claimed. 
Furthermore, B -D draw attention to many previously unnoted features of the 
bidding in the UK auction which do not fit well with standard theory, and which 
may have important implications for future auctions. 
I have learnt a lot from B-D’s analysis. In what follows, I discuss just two 
issues about which my interpretation is slightly different. 1 
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II. Efficiency of the UK Auction 
B-D’s analysis makes clear that an ascending auction like the UK’s runs the 
risk of an at least slightly inefficient outcome arising in some circumstances. 
However, it also seems clear that the actual outcome of the UK auction was 
efficient, or very close to efficient, in the sense of maximising the sum of the 
valuations of the licence holders. 
Klaus Schmidt’s (2002) excellent comment explains that the evidence from 
the bidding in the auction itself suggests that the UK auction was probably 
efficient. Evidence subsequent to the auction supports the same claim. It seems 
clear after the fact – and especially after the other European auctions – that the 
four incumbents had the highest valuations,
2 so were efficient winners. And 
there is no evidence that any losing entrant had a value for a license that 
exceeded TIW-Hutchison’s. Finally, the evidence subsequent to the auction, as 
well as from within it (including the interpretation of the bidding offered below), 
suggests Vodafone had a higher incremental value for a large license than did 
any other incumbent, and therefore that the allocation of licenses among 
winners was also correct. 
In short, all the available evidence suggests that the UK auction’s outcome 
was efficient in the sense claimed. 3 
III. BT’s Bidding Behavior 
B-D also suggests that some of the behavior they document is very hard to 
rationalise, but I conjecture that doing sufficient research into the environment in 
which the auction took place will yield good explanations, as I will illustrate by 
examining the main “puzzle”-BT’s bidding.
4 
BT’s bidding was such that the prices bid for the large (2 x 15 MHz) “B” and 
small (2 x 10 MHz) “C”, “D”, and “E” licences differed by roughly a constant in 
the early stages of the auction (phase 1 of the auction in B-D's term inology), and 
then switched to differing by roughly a fixed proportion (fifty per cent of the price 
level of the small licenses) in the later stages of the auction (phases 2 and 3 in 
B-D’s terminology). 5 This pattern seems unusual, but reviewing analysts’ reports 
                                                                   
2 See van Damme (2002) and Fortis (2000) for evidence and discussion of these value 
differences.  (Indirect evidence is also provided by the fact that only one out of the thirty 
incumbent bidders in the eight western European ascending auctions failed to win a 
license---and even this single failure was attributed to collusion or organizational strife 
within the bidder, rather than to the incumbent having a low value, see Klemperer  2002a). 
3 Cable et al (2001) use stockmarket data to argue that “there is no evidence that the 
outcome of the auction was anything but efficient”. 
4 However, B-D are to be congratulated on having already explained so much; they also 
looked at evidence from outside the auction to explain behaviour within it. 
5 That BT’s behaviour in the later stages of the auction can be described in this way was 
observed independently, by B-D and myself, after the conference in Munich to which their 
paper was contributed. The details are reported in B-D’s companion paper, Börgers and 
Dustmann (2002b). Comments on Börgers and Dustmann  3 
suggests a clue: some analysts assumed the value of the large license must be 
2
1
1  times the value of a small license (reflecting an assumption that 
2
1
1  times 
the amount of spectrum would allow offering 
2
1
1  times the service
6), while 
several other analysts insisted the large license was worth a fixed sum more 
than a small one (reflecting the additional costs – base stations, etc. – required 
to run the same service with a smaller licence), and it was clearly well 
understood in the industry that different bidders might make different choices 
between these two different valuation models.  
Of course, if one or more bidders valued the large licence at 
2
1
1  times the 
value of the small license, this cannot on its own explain the price difference 
being a fixed proportion of the value of the small license. For example, if BT’s 
private valuations for small and large licences were £ 4 billion and £ 6 billion, 
respectively, while Vodafone’s were £ 6 billion and £ 9 billion, respectively, and 
other bidders were closer to indifferent between small and large licences, then 
with “straightforward bidding” (in B-D’s terminology) the absolute value of the 
price difference would quickly move to equal  £ 2 billion (since whenever the 
price difference was less than  £ 2 billion, both BT and Vodafone would regard 
the large license as the best deal, and so would bid on it).
7 
However, it seems plausible that BT intrinsically valued a large license more 
than a smaller license by a fixed value that was considerably below 50% of the 
final price of a small license. BT may also have become very confident that 
Vodafone valued a large licence at 50% more than a small license. (Apart from 
any information from outside the auction, Vodafone never placed a bid on any 
license other than the large license in the auction.) Furthermore, BT may have 
wished to make Vodafone pay as much as possible for its license
8 for at least 
two reasons. First, this would reduce Vodafone’s budget and so make Vodafone 
a weaker competitor in subsequent auctions (the British auction was the first of 
nine western European 3G auctions, and was also followed by others elsewhere 
in the world). And second, making Vodafone pay more would make “the market” 
think Vodafone had not done better than BT in the auction. There is anecdotal 
evidence that BT was very concerned both about the stock-market’s perceptions 
                                                                   
6 The technology might actually allow offering slightly more than 
2
1
1  times the service, 




7 And even if, as I will argue, some of the early bidding was non-serious, the price 
difference would move to the fixed amount, £ 2 billion, as soon as the bidding became  
serious. 
8 After the auction BT claimed it had deliberately pushed up the price that Vodafone had 
paid, and this was reported in the press, see Cane and Owen (2000).  (At the time, this 
claim was pooh poohed by auction theorists as implausible, since it was hard to reconcile 
with the evidence without realising that BT and Vodafone might both have had different 
valuation models and also have had a reasonably clear idea of the other's valuation 
model.) Paul Klemperer  4
of its performance, and about the wider market’s view of its position relative to 
Vodafone. Allowing Vodafone to win the larger license at a lower per-MHz price 
than BT was paying might suggest BT’s managers had got a bad deal. Or it 
might suggest that BT was not able to make effective use of a larger license in 
the way that Vodafone could, and hence that BT thought it was in a weak 
market position, while Vodafone was clearly “number one”.
9 So bidding up the 
large license’s price to 50% more than the current small license price may have 
seemed a reasonable risk to take, even given the small chance of ending up 
winning the large license at hundreds of millions of pounds more than BT valued 
it at.
10 
Of course, even a small risk of winning the larg e license might seem to have a 
significant expected cost. But it was also possible that if BT did end up winning 
the large license, it might have been able to resell part of it at little or no loss, 
given that the auction prices would then have established a clear price per MHz. 
(The possibilities for resale were unclear, but Hutchison did in effect resell a 
fraction of the licence it won, very shortly after the auction, to KPN and Docomo 
at almost exactly the price per MHz that BT and Vodafone paid in the auction.
11) 
And, anyway, observers might not think BT’s managers had made a bad 
decision, even if BT did end up winning (and keeping) the large license for 50% 
more than the price of a small license.
12 
This theory, of course, leaves an important question unanswered. Why did BT 
not push up the price of the large license in the early stages of the auction? One 
reason is that much of the bidding in the early stages of the contest, when it was 
clear that there was no realistic chance of the auction ending very quickly (B -D’s 
phase 1) does not seem to have been very serious.13 In fact, some bids were 
probably slightly frivolous, or designed to attract media attention. For example, 
                                                                   
9  Klemperer (2002c)  and  Abbink et al (2002) discuss the importance of bidders’ 
concerns about relative performance in two other auctions in which BT’s and Vodafone’s 
subsidiaries both competed, the German 3G auction and the previous year’s German 
DCS-1800 spectrum auction.  (Strictly, Vodafone was not involved in the earlier auction, 
but Mannesman, which was a subsidiary of Vodafone by the time of the UK auction, did 
compete in the earlier auction.) 
10 If BT was correct in its assessment that Vodafone’s valuation of a large licence was 
(at least) 50% more than that for a small license, the (only) risk that BT faced was that 
Vodafone would quit the auction altogether. But this outcome was completely implausible, 
since it would imply that Vodafone’s valuation for a small license was below that of Orange 
and One-2-One (which were both weaker incumbents) and at least one new entrant. The 
real risk would have been that BT had misjudged Vodafone’s valuation difference between 
the licenses, and BT perhaps knew this risk was small. 
11 The UK Government now seems likely to make resale relatively easy, but this was 
unclear at the time of the auction, and actual resale of part of a license may in any case be 
unattractive since bringing a new competitor into the industry makes the remaining 
spectrum less valuable. Bringing new partners into a joint-venture as Hutchison did 
therefore seems the most relevant form of resale. 
12 Of course, the arguments of this paragraph are in effect postulating that there may 
have been important common-value elements to valuations.  Note that with common value 
elements it is plausible that the large license might be worth a fixed amount (say  
£ 500 million – £ 1 billion) more than a small license at low prices, but a constant fraction 
(say 150%) of the small license at large prices. 
13 Four bidders have informally confirmed this. Comments on Börgers and Dustmann  5 
One-2-One raised its bid by slightly more than the minimum required in round 76 
to bid  £ 1,212,100,000!
14 And BT did start pushing up the price difference 
between the large and small licences in round 99 when there were still 9 bidders 
left (so 4 more dropouts were still required to end the auction), and did not then 
stop pushing up the price difference until round 112 when the large license was 
more than 50% (and more than £ 
2
1
1  billion) more expensive than the small 
licenses. 
A more serious reason why BT did not push up the price difference earlier is 
that BT may not have wanted to influence other bidders too early to think that 
license values were very high (since these other bidders might need time to 
adjust their views, and get extra money approved by their Boards, etc.). For 
example, if BT’s valuation for a small license was £ 5 billion, it might have been 
confident that Vodafone’s value exceeded  £ 4 billion for a small license, and 
therefore that Vodafone would pay at least £ 2 billion more for a large license. 
But pushing the price difference up to £ 2 billion immediately would have sent a 
very clear signal about what the ultimate prices might be at a time at which the 
auction prices for the smaller licences were still very low, and this could only 
have been damaging to BT’s interests. 
A final possible reason why BT did not push up the price difference early on is 




1  times its valuation of the small license until later in the auction. 
Most likely BT thought that the early bidding was probably not very important 
but that its best strategy was to roughly mimic what straightforward bidding 
would have been if it had had low valuations and a correspondingly low 
difference in valuations. Certainly this is consistent w ith the evidence.
15 
So it seems possible to give a reasonable explanation for BT’s bidding. Of 
course, this may not be the only possible explanation. 16 However, the moral is 
that understanding bidding in auctions often requires knowing a lot of real-world 
detail about the players and the context in which they are operating. Facts from 
outside the bidding itself – in this case knowing the differing valuation models 
that different analysts used  – may be the key to explaining behaviour. In 
understanding auctions, as well as in designing them, “the devil is in the 
details”.17 
                                                                   
14 Additional 1’s and 2’s were ruled out, because all bids were required to be multiples 
of £ 100,000. 
15 Although Vodafone only bid on the large license, it is very plausible that Vodafone 
was following a similar strategy, but mimicking a bidder with slightly less low valuations. 
16 For example, there may have been much stronger common-value components to 
valuations than usually assumed. 
17 See Klemperer (2002 a,b,d) for more discussion of the importance of understanding 
the wider context, and of apparently small details, in auction design. Paul Klemperer  6
 
Summary 
I offer an explanation for some of the bidding in the year 2000 British 3G telecom 
auction, and observe that Börgers’ and Dustmann’s (2002) results are consistent with the 
outcome having been efficient. Comments on Börgers and Dustmann  7 
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Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter (2002) have developed an intriguing 
explanation for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 German 3G 
telecom auction. These comments on their paper discuss why I do not find their 
explanation fully satisfactory, and suggest alternative explanations, including a 
relative -performance-maximising theory. I also comment briefly on issues about 
several other 3G auctions. 
I. Introduction 
The German 3G spectrum auction was undoubtedly a success from the 
government's viewpoint. Indeed, it was probably one of only three successes 
among the nine western European 3G auctions. The measure of success most 
commonly used is total revenue raised per capita, with some adjustments for the 
level of the telecoms stock index as a reflection of sentiment towards 3G’s 
                                                                   
*  Acknowledgements: I was the principal auction theorist advising the UK government’s 
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that any of the behaviour discussed below violates any applicable rules or laws. I am 
grateful for comments from Elmar Wolfstetter and the representatives of the firms involved 
in the German auction to whom I showed an earlier draft, and I am also very grateful to 
Marco Pagnozzi for our collaboration in the study of the 3G auctions, and for his helpful 
suggestions about this essay. Paul Klemperer  2
prospects.
1 (We assume governments have no ability to time the market, and 
therefore deserve neither credit nor blame for selling when market sentiment is 
unusually positive or negative.) Based on this, the figure suggests the UK, 
German and Danish auctions were successes, while the Netherlands, Austrian 
and Swiss auctions were the biggest failures. 
 
Figure 
European 2000-2001 3G Mobile Spectrum Auctions 
 
Note: Per-capita revenues, by country o (right-hand scale),  
(auctions are shown on the dates at which they finished),  
Dow Jones European Telecom Stock Price Index (left-hand scale). 
 
 
To be sure, the figure flatters larger countries (especially Germany, 
conversely it underrates tiny Denmark), flatters centrally located countries 
(Germany, again, and also Austria and Switzerland), flatters countries with 
lightly regulated telecom industries (Germany, again, among others)  – since 
larger, centrally located, lightly regulated markets are worth more  – but it also 
ignores the fact that Germany and Austria sold more licences than other 
countries, reducing the total profitability of those markets. However, the more 
systematic discussion of the relative performance of the different auctions in 
Klemperer (2002a) comes to very similar conclusions. 
                                                                   
1 Although efficiency was generally the primary objective, there is no evidence that 
efficiency differed much across the different countries’ auctions. Hence the focus on 
revenues. Comments on Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter  3 
So, since the German auction was both a success and was of a novel and 
complex design, it clearly deserves study, and Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter’s 
(2002) paper (henceforth GRW) would be welcome for that reason alone; their 
paper gives very valuable detail about the auction and will be a key reference for 
anyone studying it. But more than that, the paper is extremely interesting and 
makes acute observations about both the German and other 3G auctions. 
I have learned a lot from the paper, and agree with much of it. However, these 
comments will naturally focus on the disagreements. Section II summarises why 
I think GRW’s explanation of the bidding in the German auction is not fully 
satisfactory, and Section III develops this point more fully (the latter section can 
be omitted by readers who do not want too much detail). Section IV suggests 
other explanations for the bidding, and Section V develops a relative-
performance-maximising theory for it. Sections VI and VII briefly comment on 
some other 3G auctions, and stress (as GRW also do) the importance of 
attracting entry into an auction. 
II. The German Auction 
In particular, I disagree with GRW’s central claim that their model, as it stands, 
rationalises the behaviour of the two strongest bidders  – T -Mobil and 
Mannesman, or “T” and “M”, in GRW’s terminology.
2 These bidders initially 
pushed up the price in the hope of driving out the sixth-strongest bidder, “bidder 
6” in GRW’s terminology, but then gave up pushing the price up so that the 
auction did actually end with six winners but at a much higher price than was 
necessary to end the auction with this number of winners. This seems bizarre. 
To put the point simply, consider T’s and M’s decision about whether to end the 
auction with six winners at some given price, or whether to push the price up 
further. Raising the per-block price by 1 euro costs T and M 2 euros each, since 
they would each win 2 blocks in a six-winner outcome. Their gain is the 
probability that bidder 6 quits, times their benefit from bidder 6 quitting. If it is 
worthwhile for T and M to push the price up in one round, but to stop pushing 
the price up in the next round, then the perceived probability of bidder 6 quitting 
in the next round must be both low, and also lower than it was in the last round. 
However, most observers thought the probability of bidder 6 quitting in the next 
round, conditional on not having previously quit, was high and increasing around 
the time T and M ended the auction (when per capita price levels were 
approaching those achieved in the UK) and was much lower earlier (a six-player 
conclusion for the auction became possible at 55% of the UK price levels). So 
any rationalisation of T and M’s behaviour must explain this apparently irrational 
behaviour of theirs. But GRW’s model sidesteps this basic issue, as I now 
explain: 
                                                                   
2 T-Mobil and Mannesman were subsidiaries of Deutsche Telekom and Vodafone, 
respectively. Paul Klemperer  4
III. GRW’s Analysis of the German Auction 
(This section can be omitted by readers who do not want too much detail.) 
To understand GRW’s argument  – and why I believe it is incomplete in this 
context – consider the preferences of either one of the two strong bidders, M 
and T. At any point of time, it would like to end the auction only if it prefers this 
to waiting until the price has risen a small further amount,  D price, before the 
auction ends. 
The gain from waiting is the probability,  6 r , that bidder 6 will quit in the price 
interval,  D price, times the value of driving bidder 6 out. This value is itself the 
benefit,  b , of winning a third block, including the benefits from excluding bidder 
6 from the industry (leading to a more concentrated, and hence more profitable, 
market), less the current price of buying an additional block. That is, the total 
gain from waiting equals  [ ] price - b r6 . 
The cost of waiting is the extra price,  D price, paid on the two units that the 
bidder will win anyway, i.e., 2( D price). That is, the bidder would prefer to plan to 
end the auction if a further price rise of D price fails to drive out bidder 6, rather 
than end it now if 
(1)  [ ] [ ] price price D > - 2 6 b r  
The bidder would prefer to end the auction now if 
(2)  [ ] [ ] price price D < - 2 6 b r . 
In GRW’s model, bidder 6’s value can only take one of two possible values, 
6 v¢  (strong type) and  6 v  (weak type), and the auction cannot be ended before 
price p (< 6 v ), so the only conceivably sensible strategies for the strong bid- 
ders are 
a)  to end the auction as soon as possible at p, or 
b)  to push the price up a further  p v price - = D 6 to  6 v  t o drive out the 
weaker type of bidder 6, but then to end the auction, or 
c)  to push the price up further still, by an additional  6 6 v v price - ¢ = D  more to 
6 v¢ , to drive out both types of bidder 6. 
The observed behaviour in the actual  auction corresponded to case b) of 
GRW’s model. 
The condition for b) to be preferred to a) is the appropriate version of (1) or 
equivalently is GRW’s equation (9).3 The condition for b) to be preferred to c) is 
                                                                   
3 In GRW’s notation,  b v + = 13 b  for the case of successfully driving out bidder 6 at 
price  6 v . Comments on Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter  5 
the appropriate version of (2), or equivalently GRW’s equation (6).
4 So these are 
the key conditions in GRW’s Theorem.
5 If (6) holds there is an equilibrium in 
which outcome b) arises. (If (6) fails, both strong bidders prefer c), and either 
can unilaterally implement it.) If (9) holds, the equilibrium is unique. If (9) fails, 
outcome b) can still be an equilibrium of the model if (6) holds, since neither 
strong bidder can unilaterally end the auction, but the equilibrium is neither 
unique, nor plausible.
6 So for the observed play to correspond to a p lausible 
equilibrium of GRW’s model, both (9) and (6) are required.
7  
Noting that (9) and (6) are just my equations (1) and (2) suggests why GRW’s 
theory seems unlikely to describe reality. Of course, (9) and (6) correspond to 
(1) and (2) evaluated at different values of  b r , 6 , price and  D price, reflecting 
the different stages of the game at which (9) and (6) are computed. So the 
observed play can correspond to an equilibrium of GRW’s model. But this 
requires that  ( ) [ ] price / D 6 r  not be too much lower when the strong bidders could 
first have ended the auction (when (1) must be satisfied) than at the actual end 
of the auction (when (2) must be satisfied).
8 
Furthermore, the tension between conditions (9) and (6) is more severe when 
the game is generalised to many small stages since the values of  ( ) [ ] price / D 6 r , 
b , and price  to be substituted into (1) and (2) cannot then vary much between 
stages, and related conditions must then hold at all the stages – an issue that 
GRW do not address.
9  In particular, (1) must hold just before the auction ends, 
                                                                   
4 In GRW’s notation,  b v + ¢ = 13 b  for the case of driving out bidder 6 at price  6 v¢ , but 
1 6 = r  in GRW’s model at stage c). 
5 GRW rename (6) as  " " pr 0 2 £ D  in their statement of Theorem 1. 
6 This equilibrium is not plausible if (9) fails because in this equilibrium both strong 
players prefer outcome a) to outcome b), but both follow the strategy corresponding to b) 
because each expects the other to do this. This logic can only hold in the two-stage 
model: with more stages, each strong player would know that if it followed the strategy 
corresponding to a), then the other strong player would follow just one round of the auction 
later (if (9) fails) – that is, the players could trivially coordinate on strategy a) in the actual 
multi-round auction, which eliminates this equilibrium. This equilibrium is, of course, also 
Pareto dominated by the more natural equilibrium for the players in GRW’s two-stage 
model, and GRW also eliminate this e quilibrium in their limited extension to multiple 
rounds (see note 9). However, an equilibrium of this kind becomes more plausible if M and 
T are each u ncertain that its rival shares its assessment of the parameters, or are 
uncertain about the rival’s objectives – see section V. 
7 GRW note that Theorem 1 requires other conditions too. 
8 It does not seem likely that  ( ) price - b  ever became very small because  b  includes 
both the value of a third block to a strong bidder and the value, b in GRW’s terminology, of 
excluding bidder 6 from the industry, leading to a more concentrated and hence more 
profitable market. Therefore,  b  must be greater than  b p + 2 , where  2 p  is the expected 
maximum of the value of a fourth block to a strong bidder and a third block to a less strong 
bidder. And, as GRW point out,  2 p  must itself be quite high for the GRW equilibrium to 
make sense – the logic of GRW’s equilibrium requires  2 p  to at least equal the final 
German auction price. (The very limited anecdotal evidence suggests that  2 p  might have 
been, very roughly, in the region of the final German auction price.) 
9 GRW do briefly consider extending their model to many rounds of bidding, but when 
they do this they maintain the extreme assumption that bidder 6’s valuation can take only Paul Klemperer  6
and (2) must hold at the price at which the auction ends. So if, as was the case 
in the actual auction, the price is changing only slowly between rounds, it is 
required that  ( ) [ ] price / D 6 r  is falling (or at least not much increasing) at the end 
of the auction. 
So, summarising the two previous paragraphs, GRW’s equilibrium requires 
that, at the end of the auction, the probability of bidder 6 quitting conditional on 
not yet having done so is both not much increasing, and not much larger than at 
the lower prices at which the strong bidders could earlier, if they had both 
wished, have ended the auction. 
And these two conditions seem implausible. A six-player conclusion to the 
auction became possible when Debitel quit at prices that were just 55% of the 
final UK prices (per capita).
10 The German auction a ctually finished at 94% of 
the final UK prices. The weakest of the six remaining bidders was generally 
thought to be either Mobilcom or “Group 3G”, the joint-venture between 
Telefonica and Sonera, so  6 r  represents the pro bability that one of these would 
quit in the next round, conditional on their not yet having quit. But Telefonica and 
Mobilcom had quit the UK auction when the price levels had reached 94% and 
100% of the final UK price level, respectively.
11 Mobilcom (at least) had made 
public statements that suggested that it was likely it would bid as far as it had in 
the UK
12, and outside observers also thought that these bidders would probably 
go a lot further than 55% of the UK auction price, but might quit at around the 
final UK price levels. Certainly, most plausible distributions of valuations implied 
that at the end of the auction the probability of bidder 6 quitting was both much 
higher than earlier, and increasing, and either of these implications is sufficient 
to rule out GRW’s equilibrium.
13 
                                                                  
two possible values,  6 v  and  6 v¢ . Thus in their extension there is no possibility of bidder 6 
quitting before  6 v , or between  6 v  and  6 v¢ , so the additional rounds of bidding are mostly 
irrelevant and (1) and (2) are relevant only at the same points at which they matter in the 
two-stage game, i.e., GRW’s conditions (9) and (6) suffice as before. In a proper many-
round extension of GRW’s game in which it is also recognised that bidder 6’s valuation is 
not restricted to just two possible values, conditions related to (1) or (2) must hold at each 
round of the game. (One difference that arises even in GRW’s simplified many-round 
version is that (9) and (6) are both required for GRW’s result to be an equilibrium.)  
10 Ending the auction at these prices would have required the cooperation of all six 
bidders, but this could probably have been obtained. And even if this seemed hard, M and 
T could together have ended the auction once the other four bidders had stopped bidding 
for three blocks; none of the other bidders had high bids for three blocks beyond round 
136 when the prices were 70% of the final UK price, and all could be proved to have lost 
eligibility for three blocks shortly thereafter. 
11 Mobilcom was in large part owned by France Telecom which was also part owner of 
NTL Mobile, the last bidder to quit the UK auction. 
12 It may be objected that such statements were cheap talk. But following through on 
them may be necessary to maintain management credibility, they probably reflected an 
availability of finance, and – what matters – they seemed credible to observers at the time. 
13 Although GRW argue (in the last paragraph of their Section V) that it was reasonable 
to expect that bidder 6 might quit at some point before the final German auction price, they 
fail to consider the crucial questions about the relative likelihoods of bidder 6 quitting at a 
very low price, or at close to the final UK prices. Comments on Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter  7 
In brief, GRW’s equilibrium requires, roughly, that the strong bidders thought it 
relatively likely that Mobilcom or Group 3G would quit while prices were well 
below UK levels but then, having seen that Mobilcom and Group 3G did not quit 
at such low prices, the strong bidders thought it both relatively unlikely, and 
increasingly unlikely, that they would quit while prices were close to UK levels. 
And this seems unreasonable. 
IV. What Actually Happened in the German Auction? 
Whilst no-one can be certain, it seems that other factors are required to 
explain the behaviour of T-Mobil a nd Mannesman in the German auction. Some 
of these factors are discussed in Klemperer (2002a,b).
14 
They include the complexity of the rules and the opacity of the information 
available to bidders about others' bids, which made it hard for bidders to figure 
out optimal strategies (T may simply have made a mistake in failing to heed M’s 
signal suggesting that they both reduce demand early on) or to understand their 
rivals’ thinking. Klemperer (2002b) stresses the apparent lack of trust and 
understanding between the two strong bidders, and discusses why this mistrust 
might have arisen. 
Furthermore, the strong bidders may not simply have been maximising 
expected profits. M and T may have focused more on their performances 
relative to each other, as might be rational behaviour for managers who had 
private c areer concerns, or were concerned that their firm seemed well-
managed and d eserving of further investment, etc. Relative -performance 
concerns may explain the auction's outcome, especially in conjunction with the 
mistrust between the bidders, as we explain in more detail in the next section. 
Other contributory factors to T’s behaviour that have been suggested include 
that T felt pressured by the stockmarket’s response to the rising auction prices 
(and that T had not fully anticipated this), and even that T’s objectives were 
affected by the fact that it was majority owned by the German government. 
V. A Relative-performance-maximising Theory of the German Auction 
GRW explain that if, for example, M reduced demand to 2 blocks while T did 
not, and T then won 3 blocks by driving out bidder 6, there would then have 
been a second auction for the remaining block which would most probably have 
                                                                   
14 Ewerhart and Moldovanu (2001) make interesting points about the German design 
but in a model in which there is only a single strong bidder, so they cannot address why 
initially both strong bidders pushed up the price, and then both stopped doing so. Also 
they do not model the second auction that would have taken place if just one strong bidder 
had pushed up price and subsequently driven a weak bidder out, and this possible second 
auction may have played an important role in behaviour in the main auction, as we discuss 
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been won by M at an expected price  2 p  (in GRW’s terminology) so both M and 
T would have ended with 3 blocks but having paid different prices for them. 
Recall also from our discussion above that when prices are still low (e.g., 
around 55% of the final UK auction price) the probability of bidder 6 quitting is 
low, so it probably maximises both firms' expected profits to reduce demand to 2 
blocks and end the auction at low prices. However, if one firm, say M, reduces 
demand while T fails to do so and continues to push the price up, there is some 
– perhaps small – probability that bidder 6 will be driven out at a price  2 p p ~< , in 
which case T and M will both end up with 3 blocks (assuming that M wins the 
block in the second auction), but T will on average pay less for its blocks than M 
(since T pays  p ~ 3 , but M expects to pay  2 2 p p ~+ ). Even in this case T and M 
may both be worse off in absolute terms than if T and M had both reduced 
demand to win 2 blocks at low prices. And because the chance of driving out 
bidder 6 at a low price is not that high, the more probable result would simply be 
that T would eventually reduce its own demand to 2 blocks later on, in which 
case both T and M would be much worse off than if they had both reduced 
demand earlier. But note that T always improves its performance relative to M 
by failing to reduce demand at prices below  2 p . 
Furthermore, even if each firm is actually an ordinary profit maximiser, but 
each firm expects the other is likely to maximise relative performance, then 
neither firm will reduce demand first (since being the only firm to reduce demand 
when prices are low risks paying  2 2 p p ~+  rather than  p ~ 3 ).
15 
Similarly, when prices are higher (e.g., close to the final UK levels), i t may 
maximise both M’s and T’s expected profits to push up the price to drive out 
bidder 6. But if one of the firms, say T, reduces demand to 2 blocks and lets M 
push up the price on its own to drive out bidder 6 at a price  2 p * p > , then again T 
and M will both end up with 3 blocks (assuming that T wins the block in the 
second auction) but T will pay less on average for its blocks than M pays (since 
T expects to pay  2 2 p * p + , but M pays  * p 3 . So T would improve both its relative 
and its absolute perfor mance if it could reduce demand alone, and M would then 
improve its relative performance by reducing demand along with T, even though 
M might increase its (and T’s) absolute profits by continuing to raise price to 
drive out bidder 6. 
The story told thus far is extreme. True, there is anecdotal evidence that firms’ 
managers cared about relative performance, and concerns about relative 
performance also seem to have played at least some role in other European 3G 
auctions (see, for example, Klemperer 2002c).
16 But M and T were surely not 
concerned only with relative performance. So one might have expected M and T 
to attempt to co -ordinate their behaviour to reduce their demands at low prices 
                                                                   
15 A similar argument is that if all firms are known to be ordinary profit maximisers, but 
firms are unsure that their rival has the same estimates of parameters such as  6 r , then 
firms may be unwilling to reduce demand first. 
16 Abbink et al (2002), section 4, provides some evidence that relative-performance 
issues were important to these bidders in the German DCS-1800 auction. Comments on Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter  9 
to maximise both of their  absolute profits. Indeed it seems that M did initially try 
to signal to T that they should do just this (see GRW and Klemperer 2002a,b). 
But T could not know whether M was sincere, and the firms apparently 
mistrusted each other's intentions (see Klemperer  2002b) and, as we have 
seen, there are very strong relative-performance arguments (it suffices that each 
feared that the other might maximise relative-performance) why neither was 
prepared to be the first to reduce demand while prices were still low. 
T then reduced demand later when prices were higher, perhaps for relative -
performance reasons
17 ,and/or because this could also improve its absolute 
performance if M failed (or was unable) to follow its demand reduction.
18,19 And 
once T had reduced demand, there a re several possible reasons why M 
followed straightaway. First, M had a strong relative-performance incentive to 
follow i mmediately, as explained above. Second, M may have wanted to 
develop a reputation for co-operative behaviour in which M and T parallel each 
other's behaviour – a kind of “relative-performance” effect but strictly driven by 
M’s long-run absolute-performance goals (see Klemperer 2002b). Third, M 
might have been concerned only with its (short-run) absolute performance, but it 
might  all along have taken the view that this would be maximised by M and T 
both reducing demand, and it might have stuck to this view (i.e., M may have 
been extremely pessimistic about driving out bidder 6 at low prices and, even 
though driving out bidder 6 seemed more  likely at high prices, remained fairly 
pessimistic – see Klemperer 2002a); this is consistent with M’s early behaviour 
                                                                   
17 It might seem that a firm could protect its relative performance by following a strategy 
of quitting only if its rival quits when prices are above  2 p . Ho wever, it takes time to be 
sure the rival has quit (because the auctioneer gave the bidders only limited information 
about their rivals’ bidding), and it also takes time to respond. Fu rthermore, some of the 
weaker players may have been staying in the auction in the hope of being a winner in a 
five-firm industry, which would have been the outcome if M and T had successfully driven 
one of them out – in particular, each of Mobilcom and Group 3G might have hoped that 
the other (or possibly E-plus or Viag) was the “bidder 6” who might have been driven out. 
In this case, when one of M and T quits bidding for a third block, these weaker players 
may expect the other of M and T to try to follow suit and may therefore try to quit first 
rather than find themselves stuck as winners in a much-less-profitable six-firm industry. So 
if e ither M or T failed to quit first when prices became high, it might have risked being 
stranded buying a third block at a higher price than its opponent, and achieving a very 
poor relative-performance. 
18 If T thought M was not too concerned with relative performance, T could improve both 
its relative and absolute performance by reducing demand once the price exceeded  2 p , 
and free-riding on M continuing to push price up to drive out bidder 6. And even if M was 
concerned with relative performance, there was the possibility that M would have been 
unable to follow T (see note 16). 
19 Of course, there may be other reasons, such as T being influenced by stockmarket 
pressure or its government ownership (see section IV). It might be argued that another 
possibility was that  b  was not in fact that high. However, this seems less likely since  b  
must have substantially exceeded  2 p  (see note 8) and if  2 p  were low then both firms 
would have been willing to reduce demand early on for relative-, as well as absolute-, 
performance reasons. Paul Klemperer  10
(signalling T to reduce demand but not unilaterally reducing demand) if it feared 
that T might place a large weight on relative performance. 
Of course, there may be other reasons for the observed behaviour in the 
auction. For example, fear that one's rival has very different perceptions from 
one’s own about the chance of driving out bidder 6 can have similar effects to 
fear that one's rival is a relative-performance maximiser
20, and Klemperer 
(2002b) emphasises the mistrust and misunderstanding between the bidders. 
But the point is that the apparently puzzling behaviour can be e xplained by 
postulating only a limited concern with relative performance. To explain why M 
and T failed to reduce demand early on, it suffices that each firm thought its rival 
put some weight on relative performance; it is not necessary that either firm 
actually did so, and even the conjectured weights on relative performance need 
not have been large if firms were also uncertain about their rivals’ perceptions 
about bidder 6’s b ehavior, etc. And not much more concern with relative 
performance is needed to explain the firms’ later behaviour in the auction. 
VI. The Austrian and Swiss Auctions 
Turning to other 3G auctions, I disagree with GRW’s assertion that the 
Austrian auction design was superior to the Swiss, except to the extent that the 
Austrian reserve price was somewhat more realistically chosen than the Swiss 
reserve. Neither auction attracted more bidders than there were winners, and 
neither involved any significant bidding. (Although there was a semblance of 
serious bidding in the Austrian auction, the bidders there were put under 
considerable pressure from the authorities to continue the bidding, and it was 
widely b elieved that the bidding only lasted the few rounds it did in order to 
create some public perception of genuine competition and reduce the risk of the 
government changing the rules.) Neither auction achieved more than 11% more 
than the r eserve price that had been set. The only important difference is that 
the Swiss reserve price had been set ludicrously low at 20 euros per capita, 
while the Au strian reserve price, although still far lower than it should  have 
been, was 90 euros per capita.21 But revenues in excess of 300 euros per capita 
should probably have been attainable in both auctions, see Klemperer (2002a). 
So both of these auctions were failures, and both were intensely embarrassing 
to their respective governments. Indeed there was no su ccessful European 3G 
auction after the UK and German auctions until the Danes switched to a sealed-
bid design. I have discussed all these auctions in more detail in Klemperer 
(2002a). 
VII. The Importance of Entry, and the UK Auction 
                                                                   
20 In particular, e ither fear can make a bidder unwilling to reduce demand first when 
prices are low, because of the perceived risk that the rival will not follow. See note 15. 
21 Of course, Switzerland sold 4 licences while Austria sold 6, but the Swiss  could 
obviously have used their same design to sell 6 l icences if they had preferred that 
outcome. Comments on Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter  11 
Where I do agree very strongly with GRW is on the importance of attracting 
entry into an auction.
22 As GRW say, “competition is not a free good” and 
auctions must be designed with this in mind. However, this does not imply that 
there is any single best design. Often a sealed-bid design is best for attracting 
entry, as is suggested by the Danish example in the previous par agraph. But 
this need not be the case. The UK design was appropriate in its context,  
because the UK auction was the first 3G auction and was therefore unlikely to 
suffer from entry problems. (See Klemperer (2002a,b) for more discussion of 
why being first was so important.) Indeed the UK auction attracted 13 bidders 
compared with the 7 that entered the German auction. It seems improbable that 
the Ge rman design would have usefully increased competition in the British 
auction, and the British design had other advantages over the German design
23, 
see Binmore and Klemperer (2002) and Klemperer (2002a) (though my view 
may be coloured by my having been the principal auction theorist for the UK 
auction
24). In another context, when Peter Cramton, Eric Maskin and I advised 
on the UK’s 2002 auction for greenhouse gas emission reductions, we chose a 
uniform -price ascending design as being most likely to attract “small” bidders 
who did not have the resources to work out how to bid correctly in a 
discriminatory price auction. 25 And nor, of course, is entry always the key issue. 
As I discuss further in Klemperer (2002d), good auction design is not “one size 
fits all”, but must always be tailored to its co ntext. 
Summary 
Grimm, Riedel and Wolfstetter (2002) have developed an intriguing explanation for the 
apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 German 3G telecom auction. These 
comments on their paper discuss why I do not find their explanation fully satisfactory, and 
suggest alternative explanations, including a relative-performance-maximising theory. I 
also comment briefly on issues about several other 3G auctions. 
                                                                   
22 I emphasised this in Bulow and  Klemperer (1996), and Klemperer (1998, 2000, 
2002d). 
23 One advantage is identified in note 16: in the German design a bidder might rationally 
follow a strategy that could mean that it felt sorry to have won as soon as the auction  
finished. 
24 I was the principal auction theorist advising the Radiocommunications Agency which 
designed and ran the UK auction. Ken Binmore had a leading role and supervised 
experiments testing the proposed designs. Other academic advisors included  Tilman 
Börgers, Jeremy Bulow, Philippe Jehiel and Joe Swierzbinski. 
25 Larry Ausubel and  Jeremy Bulow were also involved in the implementation of this 
auction. Strictly this was a descending auction, since the auctioneer was buying 
reductions in emissions rather than selling permits to emit, but the auction corresponded 
to an ascending auction to sell emissions. Paul Klemperer  12
References 
Abbink, K.,  B.  Irlenbusch,  B. Rockenbach, A.  Sadrieh,  and  R.  Selten  (2002)  The 
behavioural approach to the strategic analysis of spectrum auctions: the case of the 
German DCS-1800 auction, Working Paper, Universities of Nottingham, Erfurt, Tilburg, 
and Bonn.  
Binmore, K. and P. Klemperer (2002), The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G 
Telecom Licences, Economic Journal, 112 (478), C74–C96, and reproduced with fewer 
typos at www.paulklemperer.org. 
Bulow ,  J. and  P. Klemperer (1996), Auctions vs. Negotiations, American Economic 
Review 86( 1), 180–194. 
Ewerhart, C. and B. Moldovanu (2001), A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction, 
Working Paper, University of Mannheim, Germany. 
Grimm, V.,  F. Riedel, and E. Wolfstetter (2002), The Third Generation (UMTS)Spectrum 
Auction in Germany, ifo Studien, 48(1),  
Klemperer, P. (1998), Auctions with Almost Common Values, European Economic Review 
42 (3-5), 757–769. 
Klemperer, P. (2000), Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory, in: M. 
Dewatripont,  L. Hansen, and  S.  Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in Economics and 
conometrics: Invited Lectures to Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, and available at www.paulklemperer.org. 
Klemperer, P. (2002a), How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions, 
European Economic Review 46 (4-5), 829–-845. 
Klemperer,  P. (2002b), Using and Abusing Economic Theory. 2002 Marshall Lecture to 
the European Economic Association, forthcoming at www.paulklemperer.org. 
Klemperer, P. (2002c), Some observations on the British 3G telecom auction: comments 
on Börgers and Dustmann, ifo Studien, 48 (1), and at www.paulklemperer.org. 
Klemperer,  P. (2002d), What Really Matters In Auction Design, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 16 (1), 169–189. Figure 1:  European 2000-2001 3G Mobile Spectrum Auctions
 Per-Capita Revenues, by Country     (right-hand scale)
 (auctions are shown on the dates at which they finished)









Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
E
u
r
o
s
)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
p
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
(
E
u
r
o
s
)
U
K
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
G
r
e
e
c
e
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
I
t
a
l
y